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INTRODUCTION
A system or network may respond to change in three 
ways – absorb, adapt or transform. 
For example, if a team member is off sick, the extra 
workload may be absorbed by colleagues who see more 
patients or work longer hours. In a network, the net-
work as a whole may absorb change in the same way: if 
a key member of staff at one centre is absent, the work 
(for example, laboratory specimens) could be sent other 
centres in the network. 
If the change cannot be absorbed, it may be possible 
to adapt to the change. For example a rare disease cen-
tre which faces a shortage of medical staff may adapt 
by changing its skill mix to increase the use of specialist 
nurses with extra qualifications. 
The third possibility is to transform the organisation, 
system or network. Large scale transformation rarely 
happens because it is so difficult to do well. But for ex-
ample a network based on seeing patients face to face 
may transform to a model of telemedicine; or a treat-
ment network may transform to a teaching network to 
expand its depth and coverage. More fundamentally 
a medical network centred on hospitals may trans-
form to a patient-based network while maintaining its 
goal of improving quality of life for people with rare 
disease. 
The development of European Reference Networks 
has raised the question of the long-term sustainability 
in networks. One aspect of this problem is resilience, 
traditionally understood as the ability of a system to 
function during, and return to normal after, an external 
shock. This paper aimed to explore current thinking on 
network resilience in healthcare.  
METHOD
The bibliographic databases Medline and Embase 
were searched on 13 December 2017 using the terms 
“resilience” or “resilient” or “resiliency” and “network” 
or “system” and “health” or “healthcare”. Abstracts were 
scrutinised for relevance and full-text papers retrieved. 
A narrative review was conducted. 
RESULTS
After de-duplication, 347 citations were retrieved. A 
great majority of these papers focussed on psychologi-
cal resilience in individuals not resilience in networks. 
After scrutiny of abstracts, 12 papers were retrieved for 
full text reading and narrative review. 
DISCUSSION
Resilience and surge capacity
The original concept of resilience was developed as 
the response to massive external change. Classic ex-
amples include physical disruption (earthquake, flood, 
or terrorist action) or events such as SARS or Ebola. 
Massive economic shocks may have the same effect on 
health systems.
Therrien et al. [1] discuss the relationship between 
surge capacity and resilience. They describe four as-
pects of surge capacity, known as the 4 ‘S’:
•  staff;
•  stuff (e.g. supplies and equipment);
•  structures (e.g. hospitals);
•  systems (e.g. processes for decision making).
A resilient system will have accessibility, diversity and 
redundancy in the first three categories, but also “ap-
propriate models of decision making, communication 
and sense making, supported by organizational values 
such as self criticism, respect among employees, inno-
vation, a sense of responsibility, and the application of 
rules and best practices”.
Therrien et al. [1] use their analysis of the H1N1 epi-
demic in Canada to suggest three dimensions for plan-
ners to consider. These three dimensions are related to 
the types of complexity (detailed and dynamic complex-
ity), the temporal aspects of resilience (passive and proac-
tive resilience) and the nature of order (favorable order 
and favorable disorder).
This framework specifically relates to resilience in crisis 
situations where surge capacity is required. The under-
lying goal is returning the system to its state before the 
external shock. The next section considers the recently 
developed concept of “everyday resilience”. 
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Abstract
A resilient system is one which continues to perform its function or goal during a period 
of change. The original concept was formed around return to the status quo after major 
external shocks. Recently the concept of “everyday resilience” has been proposed. Every-
day resilience is the adaptive and learning response of systems to the daily disturbance 
of normal routines. For everyday resilience, human factors are as important as physical 
resources. Rare disease networks can use several strategies to build resilience. 
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Everyday resilience
Resilience has traditionally been conceived as the re-
sponse to the massive disruption of major events such 
as H1N1 or major economic crisis. Recent work has 
developed the concept of “everyday resilience”. Barasa 
et al. [2] provide a theoretical framework and Gilson et 
al. [3] give case studies from Kenya and South Africa. 
Barasa et al. [2] challenge the simple concept that 
resilient systems return to their original state after an 
external shock. This implies that systems are linear and 
static. But in fact health systems are constantly chang-
ing, in a myriad of small ways. They are adaptive com-
plex systems. These systems consist, in Barasa’s typol-
ogy, of both “hardware” (infrastructure, commodities, 
human resources, finance) and “software”. The software 
is both tangible (management knowledge and skills, 
and organizational systems and procedures) and intan-
gible (software of values and norms, relationships and 
power). Barasa et. al feel that it is the software which 
promotes resilience. Thus “resilience becomes an active 
process within a dynamic health system that is con-
stantly navigating challenges by becoming better”.
The case studies of Gilson et al. [3] illustrate these 
concepts. They studied a district in Kenya and two 
health districts in South Africa. Three common sets of 
issues were identified:
•  unstable and evolving governance structures;
•  resource challenges and frequent policy change;
•  instability at the service delivery front line.
Gilson et al comment that “challenging conditions 
that are the norm for those working in district health 
systems in low-income and middle-income countries. 
Health managers at these levels routinely face instabil-
ity, such as changes in governance structures and fi-
nancing mechanisms, payment and other resource pro-
vision delays, and frequent, abruptly imposed policy 
directives. They commonly work with unstable authori-
ty delegations, manage unpredictable staff and address 
changing patient and community expectations. These 
conditions are not the acute, external shocks more usu-
ally discussed in relation to health system resilience” 
[3].
This case study focused on the role of managers in a 
hierarchical system, with sub-district, district and na-
tional levels. Rare disease networks such as the Euro-
pean Reference Networks have different governance 
structures and no clear managerial hierarchy. Neverthe-
less, many health systems could agree that “challenging 
conditions are the norm”. 
Network resilience
There are very few published studies which examine 
resilience of networks (as opposed to individual hospi-
tals).
Sheaff et al. [4] provide case studies of four networks 
in the English National Health Service at a time or 
organisational change. They define network “macro-
culture” as the complex of artefacts, espoused values 
and unarticulated assumptions through which network 
members coordinate network activities. These compo-
nents of artefact, value and assumption are further ex-
plained as follows:
1. Artefacts are of two kinds
a) the network’s collective products or services – its 
“core artefacts” – and the technologies and inputs used 
to produce them;
b) symbolic artefacts which physically represent (e.g., 
as logos, publications) the values described below.
2. Values, which are also of two kinds
a) espoused, negotiable values concerning: what is-
sues, problems and tasks face the network; network 
members’ roles; rules of conduct; conventions (accept-
ed approaches and solutions to problems); and special-
ised language;
b) taken-for-granted, non-negotiable values: basic 
underlying assumptions, often so internalised as hardly 
to be consciously formulated, for instance defining the 
“moral economy” governing members’ behaviour.
Examples of artefacts from a network for coronary 
heart disease included:
• a new sub-regional primary angioplasty service;
• ensuring more equitable care for patients at the inter-
face between secondary and tertiary care;
• adaptation of national standards, e.g. [national] 
guidelines, to the local situation;
• increasing uptake of cardiac rehabilitation.
Sheaff et al. found that artefacts adapt to change 
faster than values, and values adapt faster than assump-
tions [4]. 
For a Europe-wide rare disease network, it seems 
likely that core artefacts will be products such as guide-
lines or consensus conferences. The espoused values are 
likely to be set out in the constitution or governance 
documents of the network; and we may speculate that 
the basic underlying assumptions about behaviour and 
so on may come from a common socialization into the 
profession of medicine and its allied disciplines. But 
cultural differences between countries – for example as-
sumptions about how politeness is enacted or gratitude 
is expressed – may affect the function of multinational 
networks. 
Mathematical models
Mathematical models of networks, though often hard 
to understand for non-specialists, may suggest features 
of networks worth exploring in the real world. 
Gao et al. [5] built a mathematical model of “complex” 
networks, characterised as “systems are composed of nu-
merous components linked via a complex set of weight-
ed, often directed, interactions”. This model predicted 
that density, heterogeneity and symmetry are the three 
key structural factors affecting a system’s resilience.
It is not clear how well this model describes current 
rare disease networks. We do not yet have descriptions 
of properties such as density, heterogeneity and symme-
try. The requirement for European Reference Networks 
to have members in at least eight member states guaran-
tees some level of heterogeneity because of the different 
health systems in which the centres are located. Sym-
metry implies that the networks should take care not to 
be dominated by one or two large centres. Density may 
come from an active network with plenty of interactions 
between all members of the network (as opposed to 
pairs or cliques which ignore the full membership). 
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Human factors
Martineau [6] describes “people centred health sys-
tems” in a commentary on the Ebola crisis in West Af-
rica. He calls for a focus on the people, relationships 
and local contexts that constitute health systems and 
the practices that produce crisis responses. He com-
ments [6] as follows:
“Recognising that flexibility, for example, is impor-
tant in how a health system responds to a major crisis 
must be complemented by understanding how people 
within a particular health system might actually become 
more flexible in their roles or actions, or its knock-on ef-
fects on other important health system properties. The 
capacities of health workers to reprioritise their clinical 
activities, of people who are unwell to alter their care-
seeking practices, or of previously non-health actors to 
take on new health roles vary hugely between and with-
in health systems, and depend in particular on power 
and trust relationships between each actor”.
This focus on people, on social dynamics and on the 
building of relationships reminds us that rare disease 
networks are not an abstract entity. They are a gather-
ing of people – a community. Attention must be paid to 
the building of that community through normal social 
interaction. Martineau states that “system strengthen-
ing initiatives must embed explicit localized efforts to 
build mutual trust, respect and dignity between health 
actors and the communities they serve alongside initia-
tives to improve the clinical quality of care”. Seen in this 
light, opportunities to meet face to face are important. 
Also events such as conference dinners are not optional 
extras but part of the process. 
Olafsdottir et al. [7] provide an example of the need 
to involve communities. The 2008 economic crisis in 
Iceland developed over a matter of days, requiring se-
vere cutbacks in public sector spend in all areas. In the 
health sector, the immediate response included closing 
down units (resulting in staff redundancies), changing 
7-day wards to 5-day wards, and reducing overtime 
payments. For the first time in the history of Iceland, 
out-of-pocket payments for hospitalisation were intro-
duced, which allowed for charges every time people had 
to be hospitalised, except in case of births. 
Three months after the crisis the Minister, who had 
relied heavily on external consultants, announced fur-
ther proposals [7]: 
“[One proposal] was to convert one of the hospitals 
in the capital area into a geriatric institution. Services 
usually offered in this hospital were to be redistributed 
to other hospitals. Some of the specialised services were 
to be moved to the main hospital in the capital, others 
to be tendered out to the private sector. The operating 
theatres, however, were to be merged with the operat-
ing theatre in a hospital outside the capital area (Su-
durnes), where they were to be run as a new private 
entity led by health professionals”.
These proposals were however not adopted because 
of a change of government in February 2009 and the 
resultant change in political philosophy. 
Olafsdottir et al. consider that the response to the 
economic crisis was weak because of poor transparency 
(documents and analyses supporting decisions were not 
made public) and poor opportunities for participation 
by all stakeholders (over-reliance on external consul-
tants) [7].
Evaluating and building resilience – Resilience Index
Kruk et al. have proposed a Resilience Index [8]. Al-
though designed for national health systems, it is easily 
adaptable to networks. Five “characteristics” are pro-
posed: aware, diverse, self regulating, integrated, adap-
tive. Aims and measures are set out for each character-
istic, with a total of 25 measures for systems to consider. 
For example a self regulating system will aim to isolate 
threat and maintain core functions, and to leverage 
outside capacity. The measures for this are memoran-
dums of understanding with non-state providers and 
a database of service delivery alternatives for affected 
and non-affected populations; and collaboration agree-
ments with regional and global actors. 
In the field of rare disease, for example, production 
problems have created drug shortages which required 
engagement with regional and global actors such as Eu-
ropean patient organisations and global pharma com-
panies. More locally problems in the home care sup-
plier markets have led to a requirement for databases of 
service delivery alternatives. 
Thomas et al. [9] offer a simpler framework with a 
stronger emphasis on financial and economic aspects: 
this framework was from a case study of health systems 
in Ireland following the 2008 economic crisis. They pro-
pose three categories, and some measures for each, as 
follows: 
• financial resilience (e.g. Protection of health funding 
compared to economic decline);
• adaptive resilience (e.g. Reduction in staffing with 
no commensurate reduction in service, Protection 
of services – no loss of entitlements or rationing by 
volume);
• transformatory resilience (e.g. Clear specification of 
reforms, Evidence base for reforms).
CONCLUSIONS
Rare disease networks should build everyday resil-
ience by consciously developing their day-to-day inter-
actions. They should also examine their macroculture 
of artefacts, espoused values and unarticulated assump-
tions through which network members coordinate net-
work activities. Mathematical models suggest the im-
portance of density, symmetry and heterogeneity but it 
is important to remember the people-centred aspects 
of networks.
Networks can assess their resilience by using a Resil-
ience Index.  
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